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APOLLO EXPERl ENCE REPORT 
ASCENT P ROPU LS I ON SYSTEM 
By Clarence E. Humphr ies  and Reuben E. Taylor 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
SUMMARY 
In June 1962, the Manned Spaceflight Management Council selected the lunar- 
orbit- rendezvous mode for the Apollo Program. From this concept the requirement 
evolved for  a separate lunar module ascent stage propulsion subsystem to return the 
two crewmembers to a lunar-orbit rendezvous with the command and service modules. 
A propulsion system in which hypergolic bipropellants and a pressure-fed ablatively 
cooled engine were to be used was developed. The system was to provide 3500 pounds 
of thrust. 
During the development program, emphasis w a s  placed on the use of proven 
manufacturing techniques, design integrity, and ground-based testing. This approach 
resulted in the discovery and correction of all significant problems in the engine and in 
the pressurization and feed system before using the equipment on manned flights. 
The following principal problems were encountered and resolved. Engine com- 
bustion instability was resolved ultimately by developing a new injector under contract 
to a second manufacturer. Repeated failures and discrepancies on the original 
pressurization- system regulator were resolved by modifying and adapting the lunar 
module reaction control system regulator to the ascent propulsion subsystem. Braze 
and weld- joint design problems on several pressurization and feedline components 
were resolved. Vehicle system leakage lead to redesign of feed system mechanical 
joints to provide redundant sealing capability. 
Major vehicle-integrated propulsion system testing and certification were accom- 
plished on the prototype 'PA-1 test  rig at the NASA White Sands Test Facility using 
flight-type engine and component hardware. Early flight-vehicle checkouts, accom- 
plished at Bethpage, N. Y., and at the NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center, involved 
problems that necessitated frequent component replacements because of failures on the 
spacecraft caused by component failures during qualification. The lunar module ascent 
propulsion subsystem flight systems performed within nominal predicted ranges and 
only on one series, lunar module-3, was a system problem indicated. A failure of the 
ascent propulsion subsystem helium primary regulator was indicated by a shift in  oper- 
ating pressures  to  a secondary regulator and was attributed to contamination during 
replacement of a component in  checkout. 
A review of the Apollo ascent propulsion subsystem experience is indicative that 
future system development can be augmented by early definition of realistic require- 
ments (including leakage and contamination control), a more flexible program-flow plan, 
and improvement in design and certification techniques to ensure adequate braze- and 
weld- joint inspection and parametric control, 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ascent propulsion subsystem (APS) had to operate satisfactorily to return the 
crewmen safely from the lunar surface. It was imperative that the system be as simple 
as possible to increase its reliability. Therefore, the primary considerations in the 
design and development of the APS were simplicity and reliability, whereas the sec- 
ondary considerations were performance and weight. 
The propellants were selected on the basis of experience with other programs, 
storage requirements, hypergolicity, performance, and density requirements for pack- 
aging. Pressure-fed engines were selected to decrease complexity by eliminating the 
need for pumps, associated moving parts, and controls. High-pressure gaseous helium 
(stored at ambient temperature) was selected for the pressurizing fluid. Ablatively 
cooled thrust chambers (as compared with regeneratively cooled chambers) were used 
to decrease the possibility of the propellant freezing. Wider operational limits of mix- 
ture  ratio, propellant temperature, and chamber pressure also were possible with 
ablatively cooled chambers than with regeneratively cooled chambers. A single-engine 
concept was chosen to simplify the vehicle control system requirements and thereby 
increase total system reliability. Subsystem reliability had to be achieved with a 
single system. Early studies showed that the majority of propulsion-system failures 
were caused by failures of controls, valves, and solenoids, and were not the result of 
injector o r  thrust -chamber failures. Therefore, redundancy of these components 
was used, where practical, to increase reliability in these failure -sensitive categories. 
REQU I REMENTS 
To meet guidance requirements, the APS was required to produce 3500 pounds of 
thrust, to fire for a total duration of 550 seconds, to develop 90 percent of the rated 
thrust within 0.450 second after the s t a r t  signal, and to decay to 1 0  percent of the rated 
thrust within 0. 500 second after the cutoff signal. The maximum allowable combustion- 
chamber pressure during start transients was 177 percent of the nominal combustion- 
chamber pressure.  This was a vehicle structural limitation. To minimize the heat 
transfer to the chamber, the magnitude of any periodic o r  uniformly cyclic chamber- 
pressure fluctuation o r  oscillation that occurred at a frequency of 400 hertz o r  less 
could not exceed k3 psi, and those variations that occurred at  a frequency greater than 
400 hertz could not exceed 26 psi. In addition, the engine was required to be stable 
dynamically in the presence of all self -induced o r  artifically induced disturbances, 
thereby causing fluctuations of 175 percent of nominal chamber pressure in the combus- 
tion process. Recovery time to a stable steady-state operation could not exceed 
0.020 second. 
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The required oxidizer-to-fuel mixture ratio was  1.6 to 1, with a 170 psia required 
pressure at the interface between the propellant-feed section and the engine. The 
required propellant bulk temperature was 70" k 20" F, and the fuel and oxidizer tem- 
peratures were to be within 10" F of each other. 
To RCS 
A 
The liquid propellants for the APS were nitrogen tetroxide (oxidizer) and an equal 
mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (fuel). A total of 
5213 pounds of propellant was  required, of which 196 pounds w a s  residual. 
- 
T o R C S  
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
A schematic of the APS is shown in figure 1. The propellants a r e  pressurized 
by gaseous helium at ambient temperature, supplied from two identical tanks and routed 
through redundant-flow lines into the pressure regulators. The helium is stored at a 
nominal pressure of 3150 psia and a nominal temperature of 70" F. 
I ,Bvoass 
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Figure 1. - Ascent propulsion system 
with an ambient- helium- 
pressurization system. 
Before initial ascent-engine opera- 
tion, explosive valves are used to isolate 
the helium-storage tanks. A filter in each 
helium-flow path t raps  debris from the 
explosive valves. Downstream from the 
filter, each helium-flow path has a normal- 
ly open latching solenoid valve and two 
series-connected pressure regulators. 
The primary and secondary helium- 
flow paths merge downstream from the 
regulators to form a common helium mani- 
fold. The manifold routes the helium into 
two flow paths: one path leads to the oxi- 
dizer tanks and the other path leads to the 
fuel tank. A quadruple check-valve assem- 
bly isolates the upstream components from 
the corrosive propellant vapors and pre- 
vents possible hypergolic action in  the 
common manifold that may result from mix- 
ing of propellants o r  propellant vapors as a 
result of backflow from the propellant tanks. 
Two parallel explosive valves, down- 
stream from each quadruple check-valve 
assembly, provide a positive seal upstream 
from the propellant tanks to isolate the fuel 
and oxidizer (liquid and vapor) before the 
initial ascent-engine start. This configura- 
tion reduces compatibility problems involv- 
ing helium components and prolongs the life 
of the pressurization- system components . 
3 
Immediately upstream from the fuel and oxidizer tanks, each helium-flow path 
contains a burst-disk relief-valve assembly. The relief valve on each helium-flow 
path can pass  the entire helium flow from a failed-open pair  of regulators without 
damaging the propellant tanks. A low-level sensor in each propellant tank causes a 
cabin caution light to  turn on when the remaining propellant in either tank is limited to 
approximately 10 seconds of engine operation. 
.. 
Each propellant flows through a t r im orifice to the propellant filter in the engine 
assembly, then to the isolation and bipropellant valve assemblies (propellant- shutoff 
valves). The t r im  orifice provides an engine-interface pressure  of 170 psia for  proper 
propellant utilization by the engine. A secondary distribution line is interconnected to 
the reaction control system (RCS). A series-parallel arrangement of RCS/APS inter- 
connect solenoid valves (part of the RCS) permits the RCS to burn APS propellants 
(providing the APS is pressurized and the propellant is settled during the t ime the 
interconnect valves are opened). 
. 
The ascent engine, shown in figure 2, is a fixed-injector, restartable,  bipropellant 
rocket engine that has an ablatively cooled combustion chamber, throat, and nozzle 
extension. Propellant flow to the ascent-engine combustion chamber is controlled by 
a valve-package assembly, t r im orifices, and an injector assembly (fig. 3). The valve- 
package assembly is equipped with dual passages f o r  both the fuel and the oxidizer and 
has  two series-connected ball valves in each flow path. 
P r e s s u r e  
Ox id i ze r -sha f t -  
Fuel-shaft-seal  ven t  
Fuel-actuator vent 
Figure 2. - Ascent-engine assembly. 
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Figure 3. - Ascent-engine injector and 
valves. 
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DEVELOPMENT AND QUAL1 F I  CAT1 ON 
Development of the APS through an extensive €light-test program was not feasible 
economically. Therefore, emphasis w a s  placed on using proven manufacturing tech- 
niques, design integrity, and ground-based testing. The program was designed to 
achieve a fully qualified system in time to support the first manned lunar module (LM) 
flight. The plan was  to tes t  and evaluate materials, components, and assemblies in 
progressively integrated configurations, using various test  r igs  and prototype struc - 
tural  simulators. Major phases of the development program to accomplish this plan 
are shown in figure 4. 
component level, progressed through the modular level, and, finally, moved into 
full-scale system tests. 
The development and qualification of the APS started at the 
PS breadboard- 
Deliveries 
Figure 4. - Major phases of the APS development program. 
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In addition to the mainstream hardware-test programs, other tests were designed 
to identify and resolve potential problems and to acquire test data to support the flights. 
Tests  to determine the effects of a vacuum on fuel venting from the actuator during 
engine-valve shutdown, the effects of a vacuum on the engine-valve fuel actuator when 
a large leakage occurred, and the restart limitations on the ascent engine in space were 
among the other tests. 
Components 
Helium tanks. - The contract that was awarded for the helium-tank pressure  ves- 
s e l s  w a s  delayed because of a delay in the final propulsion- system-concept definition. 
Spacecraft-weight problems necessitated detailed trade-off studies on the possible use  
of a supercritical-helium-storage system. 
supercritical-helium-storage system, the ambient- helium-storage system was retained 
even though there  w a s  a potential weight penalty. 
To avoid the complexity of the 
Ten ascent helium tanks that were approximately 0.1 inch undersize ac ross  the 
mounting base were fabricated. This fabrication e r r o r  was caused by the failure to 
consider weld shrinkage when the assembly drawings were made. The affected tanks 
were used in  the design-feasibility test  program, the design-verification test (DVT) 
program, and some of the ground tests.  Qualification of the ascent helium tank was 
completed successfully; no significant problem was noted. 
Helium solenoid latching valve. - The original subcontractor had difficulty meet- 
ing the specified differential- p r  essur  e and internal- leakage requirement s. The sub- 
contractor requested and was granted a release from the contract; therefore, a second 
source was selected for the development and qualification of the flight solenoid valve. 
Originally, the solenoid valves were designed without a requirement for  fuel and 
oxidizer compatibility; and nylon seats,  in combination with Butyl O-rings, were used 
to seal high-pressure cavities within the valve. When it was determined that propellant 
vapor would migrate because of helium pressurization, the requirement for  compati- 
bility was imposed. The subcontractor was directed to ca r ry  on parallel effort's that 
consisted of testing the existing valve design with propellant vapors for 3. 5 days to 
determine whether the solenoid valves (with compatibility squib valves in the system 
downstream from the check valves) were acceptable and developing a valve to meet 
requirements for a 44-day period of exposure to propellant vapors. At  that time, use 
of nylon and Butyl O-rings was considered adequate f o r  a 3.5-day exposure to propel- 
lant vapors. However, a design-f easibility investigation (DFI) test program was 
initiated to determine nylon and Butyl compatibility with propellant vapors for  44 days. 
Before completion of the compatibility testing, the subcontractor was directed to stop 
all work related to the 44-day propellant-compatibility redesign f o r  the solenoid valves 
because the decision had been made to retain the compatibility squib valves located 
downstream of the check valves. 
The DFI testing indicated that backup rings and lubricants were necessary to 
. prevent severe chafing of the Butyl O-rings during cycling of the solenoid valves. The 
compatibility tests showed that nylon disintegrates when it comes in contact with oxi- 
dizer vapor, proving the nylon seat  was inadequate; therefore, the seat material  was 
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changed to the present material (Teflon). Other design changes brought about during 
testing were the replacement of Teflon backup rings with Teflon "cap seals" and the 
incorporation of electromagnetic interference (EMI) suppressors . 
Cold-temperature testing during the DVT program showed the need to reduce 
O-ring friction to permit reasonable closing times. The use of a Teflon cap seal and a 
compatible lubricant (PR 240AC) solved the problem. 
When the solenoid valves were deenergized, back electromotive force in the sole- 
Zener diodes noid coils caused voltage spikes that damaged other electrical equipment. 
were added between coil leads to redirect this energy until it dissipated. The qualifi- 
cation program was completed successfully; however, the change to the dual-diode 
EMI- suppression package required a supplemental qualification program. 
The solenoid latch valve installed in test rig PD-2 (a descent propulsion test  rig 
at the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF)) demonstrated a problem in its ability to 
remain in the open-latch position after open-close commands in rapid sequence. The 
problem was  one of residual magnetism in the latch plunger, causing it to exceed the 
spring-return force when the valve was cycled rapidly. The design changes to elim- 
inate this problem were a higher force latch spring, a modified latch plunger (to house 
the new spring), and shims to maintain the required latch-spring force on assembly of 
each valve. Two valves were successfully subjected to a requalification test series.  
The solenoid valve on LM-3 leaked externally through the brazed joint at the 
valve body and an inlet tube. Upon review of the brazed-joint design, it was  found that 
the difference in  the thermal expansion of the valve body and the tube eliminated the 
clearance required for  the nickel-brazed material to flow properly. The decision was  
made to redesign the solenoid valve for  LM-5 and subsequent vehicles by using a brazed 
joint with the proper clearances and gold-nickel alloy as the braze material. A tes t  
program was initiated, with the original nickel-brazed configuration, to certify the 
solenoid valves for LM-3 and LM-4. These tests were completed successfully. 
The external leakage reported at the prime-contractor plant for the LM-3 sole- 
noid valve la ter  increased when the valve was checked at the NASA John F. Kennedy 
Space Center (KSC). The increase was partly attributed to the difference in measuring 
techniques; however, the decision at that time was to replace the leaking solenoid 
valve with the new-configuration solenoid valve at the KSC. Subsequently, the LM-4 
valves were changed to the gold-nickel-brazed configuration. A delta-qualification 
test  program was successfully conducted to certify the gold-nickel-brazed configuration 
for flight. 
Helium pressure regulator. - The original subcontractor had difficulty meeting 
the specifications for  external-leakage control and control bandwidth. The require- 
ments were determined to be unnecessarily stringent and were modified. 
Continued failures of the regulators to meet the lockup and cold-helium require- 
ment led to the search for a suitable backup. The helium regulator used for  the LM 
and the service module reaction control systems w a s  chosen and was  modified to meet 
the flows that were  consistent with the APS requirements. A backup subcontractor 
was engaged to provide the helium regulator. Testing of this regulator configuration 
showed low-frequency oscillations at nominal APS flow rates. Evaluation of the test 
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resul ts  indicated that the regulator was very sensitive to the APS modular configuration 
and, possibly, the oscillations were caused by coupling between the check valve and the 
regulator. Tests  were run at the WSTF on test r ig  PA-1 to determine the effects of 
the oscillation on the system. It w a s  determined that the oscillations did not propagate 
to the engine interface; therefore, the oscillations did not affect engine operation. A s  
a result  of these tests,  the specification was changed to allow oscillations less than 
1 5  psi  peak to peak, which were representive of those observed during PA-1 testing. 
Both subcontractors submitted regulators to the qualification program. The 
original subcontractor submittal had many discrepancies and underwent many failures 
that would require further developmental work. The backup subcontractor submittal 
underwent one failure; the regulator failed to lock up after a long blowdown. This fail- 
u re  w a s  attributed to freezing of excessive moisture in the helium used during testing. 
The moisture was verified as the failure source during subsequent tests; therefore, 
the backup unit was selected. 
The pr ime contractor in- house investigation of the cause and effect of oscillations 
in regulated pressure  was continued, and a muffler to damp the oscillations was devel- 
oped and added to the pressurization system for  LM-3 and subsequent vehicles in the 
spring of 1968. 
Squib valve. - During the DVT pro- 
gram for the squib valve, it was noted that 
the piston of the valve did not travel to the 
fully open position. The cause of the fail- 
u re  was determined to be a design defi- 
ciency i n  the piston seal (fig. 5). This 
design deficiency allowed pyrotechnic 
blowby. The valve was redesigned and, by 
means of subsequent testing, it was veri- 
fied that the system was acceptable. 
In late 1966, a squib valve that had 
previously met all acceptance-test leakage 
requirements was found to be leaking at a 
braze joint while it was installed on one of 
the WSTF tes t  r igs  (PA-1). An investiga- 
tion of the failure revealed an inadequate 
- 
Figure 5. - Squib valve. 
braze joint between the inlet tube and the valve body. The faulty braze joint probably 
resulted from excessive porosity o r  poor brazing flow. The design of the braze joint 
did not lend the joint to adequate inspection procedures; therefore, the pr ime contrac- 
tor  initiated an inline braze change from an internal braze joint to an external braze 
joint that could be inspected. The modified design was not incorporated at this point 
in  the program because the failure was believed to be an isolated case. 
During the Apollo 9 (LM-3) mission in March 1969, the descent-engine pressur-  
ization system had a leak that was s imilar  to that observed at the WSTF on test r ig  
PA-1. Later, after the LM-2 drop test in  May 1969, another squib valve was found to 
be leaking after operation. As a result  of these additional failures, a decision was 
made to replace all valves of the early brazed configuration on the lunar modules. 
. 
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Quadruple check valve. - Only minor problems with the quadruple check valve 
were experienced in the development program. The qualification-test program was 
successful, even though some of the valves did not meet the leakage specification of 
10  scc/hr. The leakage rates experienced were determined to be acceptable for the 
LM missions because squib valves were retained for helium-system isolation purposes 
and operated just before ascent-engine operation. 
Propellant tank. - During development testing, a production LM ascent- stage 
propellant tank was mounted in a fixture, placed in a temperature-controlled environ- 
mental chamber, filled with oxidizer (nitrogen tetroxide) to 98 percent of the total tank 
volume, temperature conditioned at 105" F, pressurized to 245 psi with 1 0 0  percent 
gaseous helium, and maintained at these test conditions for 47 hours. A t  the end of 
this  period, the test vessel started losing pressure at the rate of 2. 5 psi/min, indi- 
cating a tank failure. Visual inspection of the tank revealed a 0.5-inch crack in the 
membrane area of the lower hemisphere. A metallurgical evaluation of the tank mate- 
rial disclosed the presence of stress corrosion similar to that experienced at about the 
same time period with other titanium oxidizer tanks. The amount of nitric oxide in the 
oxidizer had been reduced recently in the process specification to procure purer nitro- 
gen tetroxide. The resolution (addition of nitric oxide to the nitrogen tetroxide) was 
common to all oxidizer tanks in the program. The amount of nitric oxide required in 
nitrogen tetroxide to eliminate the stress corrosion was 0 . 4 5  to 0 . 9 5  percent. 
In an effort to save weight, all-welded tank configurations were developed in 
which the manhole closures at the bottom of the tank and on the diffuser at the top of 
the tank were modified. This alteration saved approximately 8 pounds per tank by 
eliminating the heavy bolted flanges. Titanium pipe elbows were welded to the closure 
and the diffuser, and bimetallic joints were used to make the transition from the tita- 
nium elbows to the type 304L stainless-steel lines. The zero-gravity can and antivortex 
baffle were redesigned using titanium rather than aluminum. The modified tanks suc- 
cessfully completed qualification in May 1969. 
Propellant feedlines. - Originally, the propellant feedlines were designed to incor- 
porate flex hoses to absorb the movement of the lines. During design-verification 
testing, a failure of the flex hose was experienced. In June 1966, the flex hose was  
replaced with a bellows assembly. The bellows assembly was modified further to 
incorporate restraining bars  after misalinement of the lines w a s  noted on LM-1. For  
LM- 3 and subsequent vehicles, ball joints were installed instead of the bellows. 
Because of the weight problem of the LM, a weight-saving program was  initiated 
that resulted in  reducing the propellant-feedline wall thickness. The new feedlines 
were installed on LM-6 and subsequent vehicles, and the subcontractor initiated a 
qualification program to verify the acceptability of the thin-wall line and ball- joint 
assembly. A leak was  detected during vibration qualification testing on the lightweight 
lines. The leak was  located at the bracket that holds the line to a torus ring at the 
bottom of the tank (fig. 6). The propellant-feedline design required welding of the 
bracket to the line; during subsequent vibration testing, cracks were noted in the 
welded area. Examination of the failure revealed that the problem resulted from a 
concentration of stresses in the welded area during vibration. The solution was  to 
distribute the s t resses  by incorporating another supporting member in the design. 
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Figure 6. - Ascent propulsion system 
propellant-tank torus ring. 
During the setup for the tank-qualification 
test, which incorporated the section of pro- 
pellant line where the leak had been experi- 
enced, cracks were noted in the welded 
areas .  A thorough investigation revealed 
that the cracks were induced during the 
welding of the bracket to the line. The fol- 
lowing decisions were made as a result of 
the investigation. 
1. The LM-5 (heavyweight config- 
uration) w a s  to be flown with no modifica- 
tions because the 0.049-inch wall thickness 
was provided already. 
2. The bracket for all lines less than 
the 0.049-inch wall thickness was to be 
ground off and, if there  were no cracks, a 
clamshell bracket and saddle were to be 
installed with epoxy for  structural  support. 
This modification was made on the LM-6 
oxidizer line and on both oxidizer and fuel 
lines for  LM-7 to LM-9. 
3. For  LM-10 and subsequent vehi- 
cles, a new propellant-feedline section 
without the weld w a s  to be used. - 
Ascent Engine 
The contract to develop the ascent engine was awarded in July 1963. By early 
1967, it was apparent that the injector development probably would constrain the Apollo 
missions as a result  of failures that had occurred during stability testing. Consequent- 
ly, a backup contractor was selected to  develop an injector that would satisfy the 
requirements of the Apollo missions and that would be compatible with the other engine 
components developed by the original engine contractor. 
The original ascent-engine development w a s  divided into four categories: the 
injector, the ablatively cooled thrust chamber, the bipropellant valve, and the engine 
assembly. 
Injector. - Three different types of injector patterns were released for  fabrica- 
tion. The types were an alternating-triplet grid pattern, an alternating-triplet grid 
and radial patterns, and a radial-triplet pattern (fig. 7). Each pattern used a bar r ie r  
doublet (oxidizer and fuel) for chamber cooling. 
In the summer of 1964, an injector that had a radial-triplet pattern was selected 
f o r  the prototype because of its characteristic compatibility with the ablatively cooled 
. thrust chamber. Performance was still a problem; therefore, modifications to the 
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injector pattern that increased the film-barrier propellant-mixture ratio to achieve 
higher performance and still maintain thrust-chamber compatibility were pursued. 
Fuel p r imary  
0.0242 t 0 . W 5  
Oxid izer  p r imary  
0.0419 f 0.0005 
Fuel b a r r i e r  
144 pr imary  t r ip le ts  
56 b a r r i e r  doublets 
A l te rna t i ng  t r ip le t  g r i d  
Fuel pr imary  0.0250 0.0005 
Oxidizer p r imary  0.0430 + 0.0005 
;y;por r ie r  
+ 0.0005 
Oxidizer b a r r i e r  
0.03% 0.0005 
0.0310 ? 0.0005 
0.03% 0.0005 
Or i f i ce  sizes 
B 3  type B 3 - L  type 
P r imary  oxidizer 0.0492 0.0571 
Pr imary  fuel 0.0292 0.0330 
Bar r i e r  oxidizer 0,0210 0.0236 
B a r r i e r  fuel 0.0260 0.0295 
120 pr imary  t r ip le ts  ( f u e l  on oxidizer1 
4 pr imary  t r ip le ts  (oxidizer on luell 
D imens ions  are i n  i nches  
32 b a r r i e r  doublets 
A l te rna t i ng  g r id  and  radial Radial t r ip le t  
Figure '7. - Types of injector grid patterns. 
In the fall of 1964, two changes in requirements were imposed: the NASA Manned 
Spacecraft Center (MSC) combustion- stability criteria were clarified and the continuous- 
burn time was  increased to 460 seconds because of increased vehicle weights. 
Combustion- stability tes ts  on the unbaffled injector were delayed because of the lack 
of availability of instrumentation. In late January 1965, the unbaffled injector was 
determined to be unstable under the new criteria, and the design of a baffled configura- 
tion was  initiated. 
The original contractor investigated several baffle configurations. Using expe- 
rience from the descent-engine program, a flow-through baffle design for cooling was 
implemented. This design was selected, even though several combustion instabilities 
occurred with metal chambers used in bomb tests during the development phase of the 
program. These failures were explained as hardware failure before instability, loca- 
tion of the bomb in the throat of the thrust chamber that was thought to be an unrealistic 
test condition, o r  the result of a gap between the baffle and the chamber. This deci- 
sion was explained further with the hypothesis that an ablatively cooled chamber would 
help damp combustion oscillations. Two versions of the baffled-injector configuration 
were designed. Because of fabrication problems, both injectors required 6 to '7 months 
to fabricate. As a result of the time required to develop the baffled injector and the 
requirement to  meet schedules, the production release was  required before either 
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configuration was hot fired. A decision was made to select the configuration fo r  pro- 
duction that gave the higher performance and ablative compatibility, as determined 
from the test results of various development injectors. 
The initial firing of the production injector exhibited erosion of the ablative 
chamber material near the injector-chamber interface. To eliminate this problem, 
modifications were made to the bar r ie r  orifices; these modifications reduced the 
erosion. During the oxidizer- and fuel-calibration runs for  the engine qualification 
with the baffled injector, the engine underwent combustion instability when bombed 
with an artificially induced disturbance in an ablatively cooled chamber. The engine 
was  inadvertently allowed to  continue to fire in  this unstable mode for a time sufficient 
to  cause extensive damage to the injector. Because of the damage, it could not be 
determined whether the hardware was defective before instability o r  whether the in- 
stability caused the damage. It was concluded that the instabilities were the result  of 
hardware failure. Additional testing proved that these conclusions were erroneous. 
A plan was devised to evaluate the ability of the engine to withstand combustion 
disturbances without becoming unstable and to characterize the instabilities if they did 
occur. The lack of hardware caused this plan to proceed slowly. When combustion 
instability occurred in an ablatively cooled chamber during bomb testing, it was con- 
cluded that the injector was not satisfactory for  the Apollo vehicle. Later, a sponta- 
neous instability occurred 290 seconds into an acceptance firing, further substantiating 
the conclusion that the injector design was unsatisfactory. 
Numerous modifications were made 
to the injector in an attempt to solve the 
stability problem. A photograph of the 
final configuration (fig. 8) shows the injec- 
to r  and the devices that were used in an 
attempt to  ensure stable operation of the 
engines. The final configuration exceeded 
the performance requirement for  the 
engine. 
Ablatively cooled thrust  chamber. - 
The original design for  the ascent engine 
defined the thrust chamber as being abla- 
tive, with a radiation-cooled nozzle. The 
radiation- cooled nozzle had been shown to 
be technically feasible; however, this con- 
cept had never been applied to an engine 
that was buried in the vehicle o r  that was 
required to perform fire-in-the-hole 
starts f rom another stage (using the 
Figure 8. - Stability devices on the 
production injector. 
descent stage as a launch platform). Evaluation of the possible problems with the 
radiation-cooled nozzle led to the selection of an ablatively cooled nozzle for  the ascent 
engine, even though the engine weight would be slightly greater.  Some of the reasons 
for  abandoning the radiation-cooled nozzle were high design risk, high cost, lack of 
development experience with buried installations, and modifications required in the 
tes t  facilities. 
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The total weight of the chamber with a n  ablatively cooled nbzzle was approxi- 
mately 161 pounds. A weight-saving program caused a change in the material of the 
thrust- chamber insulation and nozzle ablator and, thereby, the weight was reduced 
34 pounds. Test  results showed a marked improvement in  the ablative characteristics 
of this chamber and it was certified for use on manned flights. 
Bipropellant valve. - The bipropellant-valve concept was  a series-parallel ball- 
valve arrangement that was  actuated hydraulically by an electrical solenoid pilot valve. 
The development testing of the valve was  performed at the valve level; however, 
because of direction to qualify the component at the highest possible subassembly level, 
qualification testing was  performed at the engine level to certify the valve for  LM-1. 
Out-of - specification leakage was  observed during qualification testing of the valve 
actuator. The leakage was acceptable for the unmanned flights, but design changes 
were incorporated for la ter  vehicles. 
A s  a result of long-term usage of bipropellant valves in oxidizer vapors at the 
WSTF, it was  found that the needle bearings were subject to corrosion. Thus, in 
mid-1967 the needle-bearing material was changed to stainless steel. In mid-1968, 
the fuel actuators experienced leakage caused by O-ring twisting during valve operation. 
Several valves on production engines at the backup-engine contractor plant were re- 
jected. Top-visual-quality 0- rings were installed without success. Subsequently, it 
was determined that the original leakage requirements were too stringent and that the 
valves were satisfactory under more realistic requirements. 
Engine assembly. - Analyses of the heat-shield structural margins during fire-in- 
the-hole (FITH) testing of the engine indicated a negative margin because of the 
combustion-chamber-pressure peaks during the start transient of the engine. The con- 
tractor investigated several means of reducing the chamber-pressure overshoot without 
changing the valve design, but all solutions tried were unsuccessful. Therefore, the 
heat-shield structure on the vehicle w a s  modified to accommodate the higher chamber 
overshoot during FITH testing. Similar problems were experienced by the backup 
contractor. 
Because of the problems in combustion stability and ablative compatibility asso- 
ciated with the first production injectors, the engine-development program of the orig- 
inal contractor was  divided into two phases. The first phase was a test  program to 
certify that the early engines, equipped with early production injectors, were accept- 
able for  flight on the LM-1 and LM-2 unmanned vehicles, and the second phase was a 
test program to certify that the engine with a stable combustion injector w a s  accept- 
able for  the manned LM-3 and subsequent manned vehicles. 
The first phase, certifying the engine for LM-1 and LM-2 vehicles, consisted of 
one DVT sea-level test engine, five DVT altitude-test engines, and three DVT altitude- 
qualification-test engines. Two additional problems were noted during th is  test pro- 
gram. The problems were the ablatively cooled thrust-chamber erosion and leakage in 
the valve actuator. However, it was concluded from these tests that the engine was 
satisfactory for  the unmanned vehicles. 
The second phase of the program consisted of three DVT altitude engines, one 
DVT sea-level engine, and four DVT altitude-qualification engines. Because the 
injector-fabrication processes were changed to use electrical-discharge machining 
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of the orifices, an additional qualification engine and one DVT sea-level engine were 
added to the test program. Thrust-chamber erosion w a s  observed during these tests, 
Backup engine contractor. - The backup contract was initiated and managed by 
the MSC with close interface with the vehicle contractor. The scope of the contract that 
was awarded encompassed the design, development, and qualification of a flight injector 
fo r  the LM ascent engine. This effort also included the assembly, test, and production 
of complete rocket engines by integrating this qualified injector with thrust chambers 
and propellant valves furnished by the original engine contractor. 
Candidate injectors were selected, tested, and evaluated to evolve a stable, 
high-performance configuration that w a s  compatible with the ablatively cooled thrust 
chamber. The basic injector design selected was a baffled, flat-faced, multiring unit 
with integral propellant-distribution manifolding and acoustic cavities. The three 
injector-orifice patterns that were evaluated included a triplet, consisting of two fuel 
s t reams impinging on each oxidizer stream; an unlike doublet, in which a s t ream of 
oxidizer impinged on each fuel stream; and a mixed doublet, in which this mixing of 
oxidizer and fuel was a secondary result  of fuel-fuel and oxidizer-oxidizer impingement. 
The unlike doublet was selected as the production injector because of its per- 
formance, compatibility, and stability margins. 
minor changes in the fuel-film cooling in the basic unlike-doublet injector design to 
optimize performance and ablative compatibility while maintaining a wide margin of 
combustion stability. 
ibility requirements. 
Efforts were directed toward making 
The final configuration exceeded the performance and compat- 
Because of a combustion instability during bomb testing on an injector that had 
experienced severe face damage, a "soft center" modification was made to improve 
stability characteristics. The modification consisted of closing off six of the nine 
impingement se t s  at the center of the injector. The change reduced the injection density 
in the center of the injector and reduced the amount of propellant available for  possible 
enhancement of radial combustion waves. 
A complete final-design injector is shown in figure 9, and a section through the 
propellant inlets is shown in figure 10  to illustrate the flow passages. An early injec- 
tor inlet screen (filter) is shown in figure 11 installed in the typical manner. A s  can 
be seen i n  figure 11, the fi l ter  is a woven-wire-cloth truncated cone with pleats. The 
fi l ter  has a solid plug that effectively serves  as a dynamic-head- suppression device, 
and the filter protects the injector orifices f rom contamination. The pleated filter, 
made of all-welded corrosion- resistant steel, with a 120-micron length along two 
major axes, was designed to stop all particles. 
Although the pleated filter successfully completed all the required qualification 
tests, the contaminant-capacity requirements of the test plan were not consistent with 
levels of potential contaminant in the vehicle propellant tanks. The potential for  pres- 
sure  drop across  the pleated-injector-inlet filters could have a significant effect on the 
engine mixture ratio and, consequently, on the ascent- stage propellant utilization. For 
vehicles not landing on the lunar surface,  the propellants usually were off-loaded, pro- 
pellant utilization was not considered critical, and the pleated filters were acceptable 
for use in engines for  these vehicles. A more efficient inlet screen that was to have a 
' 
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Figure 9. - Final-design injector. 
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Figure 11. - Injector filter. 
Figure 10. - Propellant-inlet section of 
the injector manifold. 
lower pressure  drop when contaminated was 
designed for  lunar-landing vehicles. The 
new injector-inlet filter (caged fi l ter)  was 
designed to meet the revised requirements 
for contaminant capacity and to provide 
additional structural  support for  preventing 
screen deformation. 
After qualification tes t s  were com- 
plete, a structural failure of a production 
filter occurred during an engine-acceptance 
test. The failure was caused by the 
resistance-weld procedure that was used for  
attaching the heavy, outer mesh-support 
basket to the upper collar of the filter. The 
strength developed by the weld was insuffi- 
cient to withstand the maximum fil ter load 
during service. A modification that elim- 
inated the need for  resistance welding was 
made to the fi l ter  design. 
The occurrence of preignition-pressure spikes during engine startup required a 
change in  propellant ducting to ensure that the oxidizer would reach the combustion 
chamber before the fuel. The modified duct is shown in figure 12. 
Formal demonstration of the accept- 
ability of the complete engine for  lunar 
flight w a s  accomplished by testing six 
rocket-engine assemblies through a qual- 
ification se r i e s  of environmental t es t s  and 
hot-firing demonstrations. The engines 
were produced as complete production units 
and were fully representative of flight 
engines. Reuse of bipropellant valves dur- 
ing this program was necessitated because 
of hardware shortage. The acceptance 
. 
Figure 12. - Modified engine fuel duct. 
15 
testing revealed a problem in production fabrication that required a change in the weld- 
ing procedure to prevent fatigue cracks f rom developing in the weld attaching the baffle 
base to the injector face. The change in the welding procedure improved the injector 
so that it was declared capable of performing the requirements of a manned lunar- 
landing mission. 
Used at the WSTF with test r ig  1 HA-3 
The selection of the backup-contractor engine for use on the flight vehicles was  
made from an evaluation of each contractor production engine. The backup contractor 
also had complete qualification-testing facilities and had production hardware available 
for installation on the vehicle when required. 
The responsibility for the backup engine was  assigned to the vehicle contractor 
subsequent to t h e  decision to use that engine for  the LM. Formal demonstration of the 
acceptability of the complete engine with the lighter weight chamber, updated valve, 
and improved engine fi l ters w a s  accomplished by testing four additional rocket-engine 
assemblies under the direction of the vehicle contractor. 
Test Ar t i c les  and Test Rigs 
Several test art icles and test rigs were developed and tested to accomplish the 
APS testing program. The test art icles and test rigs contributing to the APS develop- 
ment and qualification a r e  listed in table I. 
TABLE I. - MAJOR TEST ARTICLES AND RIGS 
Development phase 
Breadboard 
Test art icle 
o r  rig Remarks 
Pressurization 
modules 
BA- 1 
BA- 2 
BA- 3 
BA- 4 
Used at the factory with test  rig 
HA-1 
Used at the original engine- 
contractor facility with test 
r ig  HA-2 
Cold-flow tests at the factory 
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TABLE I. - MAJOR TEST ARTICLES AND RIGS - Continued 
Development phase 
Prototype 
Installed test 
ar t ic les  
Test art icle 
o r  r ig 
Propellant storage 
and feed system 
test r igs  
HA- 1 
HA- 2 
HA- 3 
HA- 4 
Pressurization 
modules 
PRA- 1 
PRA- 2 
PRA- 3 
PRA- 4 
PRA- 5 
PRA- 6 
Propulsion system 
test r igs  
PA- 1 
PA- 2 
LM test  articles 
LTA-1 
LTA-2 
Remarks 
Used at the factory for cold-flow 
testing 
Used at the original engine- 
contractor facility for engine 
development tes ts  
Used at the WSTF for FITH and 
engine development tests 
Used for engine development tes ts  
Used mainly on PA-1 
Used at the WSTF for  propulsion 
system certification 
Canceled 
Electrical and EMI tes ts  of the 
propulsion components 
Configured for  flight test, flown on 
AS- 502 
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TABLE I. - MAJOR TEST ARTICLES AND RIGS - Concluded 
Development phase 
Full-configuration 
tes t  article 
Test art icle 
o r  r ig 
LTA- 3 
LTA-4 
LTA- 5 
LTA-6 
LTA- 7 
LTA-8 
LM- 2 
Re marks 
Used for structural  and vibration 
tests to define component vibra- 
tion levels 
Environmental t es t s  in  the factory 
vacuum chamber 
Descent propulsion rig at the WSTF 
Canceled 
Canceled 
Thermal tests at the MSC to define 
thermal l imits 
Used in drop tests at the MSC. 
Ascent stage sent to  Osaka, 
Japan, for  Expo '70. It was 
transferred to the Smithsonian 
following Expo '70. 
Breadboard testing. - The breadboard testing was initiated to achieve early system 
verification of design, interaction of components, and technical feasibility of design. 
Four heavyweight test  r igs  were built; these r igs  were essentially open s t ructures  
upon which the various propellant-feed- section components and the pressurization 
modules could be mounted in the same arrangement and relative locations as on the 
LM. The rigs were used for  cold-flow testing at the prime-contractor facility, for  
testing at the engine-contractor facility in  the early engine-development program, for  
helium-pressure-blowdown tests in the prime-contractor cold-flow facility, and for  
system testing with preproduction engines and components at the WSTF. 
Prototype testing. - Most of the prototype testing of the APS was conducted on the 
WSTF test rig PA-1. This test r ig  was an ascent-stage structure that incorporated 
the APS and RCS equipment in an approximate flight configuration (fig. 13). Simula- 
tion was used except where it would affect the APS performance. The test rig accom- 
modated both the pressure-fed, 3500-pound-thrust ascent engine for  firing in a 
downward position and the 16 RCS engines, using a separate propellant-supply system 
interconnected with the APS propellant tanks. The PA-1 ascent stage was constructed 
of aluminum alloy and consisted of three major sections: the forward cabin, the mid- 
section, and the aft equipment bay. The s t ructure  included provisions f o r  installing 
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heat shields for the FITH testing. A sum- 
mary of the tes ts  conducted on test  r ig PA-1 
is given in table 11. These tes t s  included 
all normal mission requirements and a 
number of off-limit tes ts  of possible prob- 
lem areas  such as FITH tes ts ,  pressure 
overshoots, and component-abort tests. 
Although all of these hot-firing tes ts  were 
not conducted with a qualified engine injec- 
tor,  the tests proved successfully the in- 
tegrity of the propellant and pressurization 
sections. 
, 
Figure 13. - Test r ig PA-1. 
TABLE II. - THE PA-1 WHITE SANDS TEST FACILITY TEST SERIES SUMMARY 
Test  
series 
1 
2 
4 
5 
6 
7A 
7C 
8R 
8 
EA 
5A 
9 
7B 
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Number 
of 
runs 
Ser ies  features 
Cold-flow (substitute and actual propellants) 
FITH star ts ,  abort, and normal mode s ta r t s ,  p repressure  bal- 
ance and unbalance, compatibility of APS with RCS 
LM-1 mission duty cycle, res tar ts ,  e n g n e  stability, propellant 
depletion, off-nominal performance 
Cold-flow (substitute and actual propellants) LM-1 
Sea-level firings, LM-1 mission duty cycle (2 ) ,  pressure  regu- 
la tor  evaluation, abort, and normal and off-limit s t a r t s  
FITH s ta r t s ,  abort, and normal mode s t a r t s  
Cold-flow (substitute and actual propellants) LM- 3 
Mission duty cycle to  depletion, off-nominal s t a r t s  
Mission duty cycle with APS/RCS, heat-soak-back temperatures ,  
helium-saturated-propellant evaluation 
Propellant depletion, pressure regulator malfunction, abort 
s tar ts ,  propellant utilization 
Propellant utilization with off-nominal conditions 
Blowdown mission duty cycle, propellant utilization, cold s ta r t  
FITH s ta r t  evaluation, adequacy determination of thermal  
protective blankets and blast deflector 
High- mixture-ratio mission G duty cycle demonstration 
aNo hot firing during cold-flow tes t s  
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With flight-qualified engines, 57 t es t s  were conducted over a total firing time 
of 3392 seconds. Five engines and six thrust chambers (three heavyweight and three 
lightweight) were used. The following a r e  the resul ts  of these tests. 
1 .  The mixture ratio of the ascent engine could be predicted within 0.6 percent 
for engine operation at chamber pressures  of 112 to 130 psia and temperatures of 
40' to 100' F with helium-saturated and unsaturated propellants. 
2. Combined with RCS operation, the overall APS and RCS mixture ratio could 
be predicted within 0. 75 percent. 
3. The validity of the propellant-feed- system cold-flow calibrations was veri- 
fied, and the flight -engine characterist ics were confirmed. 
4. The FITH starts, at simulated lunar-launch conditions, were performed 
with no structural damake o r  adverse effect on engine performance. 
5. Abort s ta r t s  were performed safely at ullage pressures  of 62 to 215 psia. 
6. Engine operation was not affected adversely by operation on redundant 
regulators. 
7. The transition to the adjusted system-pressure levels was smooth and 
gradual. 
8. The engine operated safely in  the tank-ullage-decay (blowdown) mode from 
nominal chamber pressure to 8 psia, and it could be safely shut down by means of 
propellant depletion. 
SYSTEM CHECKOUT 
During the functional checks on LM-1 and LM-3, the relief-valve burst  disks 
ruptured prematurely. Investigation revealed that the burst-disk design would not 
allow any backpressure on the disks without premature rupture. A s  a result  of these 
failures, the checkout procedures were reviewed and corrected in an attempt to pre- 
clude this occurrence on other vehicles. In spite of the precautions taken, premature 
rupture of relief-valve burst  disks remained a checkout problem throughout the 
program. 
Quadruple check-valve leakage was a common checkout problem, and most 
vehicles required special work and testing to correct  the leakage. Either purging to 
correct  the leakage, valve replacement, o r  waivers to accept the leakage were required 
on most vehicles. The many debrazing and brazing operations that were required in 
order  to replace the check valves also introduced contamination into the system. As a 
result, complete helium- module replacement was necessary (for instance, on LM- 3). 
Design changes were considered to improve the checkout problem but were not 
implemented. 
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Early vehicle checkout was plagued by component replacement resulting from 
failures of the components either during checkout o r  elsewhere in the program (such 
as in qualification system tests). Particularly, failure w a s  frequent on the helium 
regulators, the helium solenoid valves, the helium relief valves, and the engine. 
FLI GHT PERF0 RMANCE 
The flight program for the LM consisted of one unmanned flight (LM-1). The 
LM-2 vehicle was planned for an unmanned flight, but this was canceled and LM-2 was 
used as a ground-based test article. The first manned vehicle was LM-3, which 
demonstrated successful operation in earth orbit. The LM-4 vehicle was used in 
lunar-orbit-operation tests, and LM- 5 was the first lunar-landing vehicle. 
Apol lo 5 Mission 
Apollo 5 (LM-1) was the first mission with a flight-configuration lunar module. 
The primary objectives of the Apollo 5 mission included verifying the APS and the 
abort-staging function for  manned flight. 
was  installed in the APS. 
An engine from the original engine contractor 
A s  a result of the premature shutdown of the descent engine, an alternate mission 
plan was  selected that resulted in two ascent-engine firings. The first firing wa.s of 
60 seconds duration. Approximately 1-1/2 hours later, the engine w a s  again com- 
manded on and fired to propellant depletion. The total ascent-engine firing time for 
the mission was  approximately 40 seconds less than predicted. At  least 2 0  seconds 
of this time can be attributed to higher-than-expected propellant usage by the RCS 
engines through the propellant interconnect as a result of the control configuration 
after staging. Another 10 seconds of th i s  time was caused by propellant slosh. High 
vehicle-attitude rates  caused the propellant-tank outlet ports to be uncovered prema- 
turely. An oxidizer-depletion shutdown had been expected. However, when the pro- 
pellant in the feedlines (sufficient for  approximately 1 second of nominal operation) 
was  depleted, as indicated by the engine-interface pressure,  helium was ingested into 
the oxidizer and the fuel lines almost simultaneously, causing thrust decay. A s  indi- 
cated by the abbreviated 
decay, an additional 10 seconds of normally usable propellant was  in the tanks at thrust 
decay, but was  unavailable because of the sloshing and high vehicle-roll rates. 
time between low-level sensor uncovering and thrust 
The start transient and the beginning of steady-state operation showed high- 
amplitude chamber-pressure oscillations on both the first and the second engine starts. 
The 400-hertz oscillations, which occurred immediately after the start-transient over- 
shoot, were characteristic of the original-contractor engine during ground-based 
testing and were  expected on th is  flight. The oscillations appeared to be a form of low- 
frequency instability, caused by the coupling of the combustion process with the reso- 
nant frequency of the engine propellant-feed system. Ground-based tests were 
indicative that gaseous helium, dissolved o r  entrained in the fuel, tended to induce 
coupled instability. 
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The high-magnitude 400-hertz oscillations resumed approximately 4. 5 seconds 
before thrust decay, an indication of propellant gas entrainment caused by the vortexing 
o r  sloshing resulting from the high vehicle-attitude rates that occurred during this por- 
tion of the mission. The thrust  decay appeared smooth; no spikes o r  other detrimental 
effects were apparent after the damping of the 400-hertz oscillations and the initiation 
of the chamber-pressure decay. 
The engine valves should close immediately after fuel depletion because the valves 
a r e  fuel-actuated. Following depletion, the engine-valve-position indicators showed 
that the engine valves did not start to close until 85 seconds after the thrust started to 
decay and were not closed completely when the telemetry signal was lost  by the ground 
station 58 seconds later.  System pressures  and temperatures indicated that some 
blockage of fluid flow occurred between the propellant tanks and the engine after the 
initial thrust decay. The blockage was most likely caused by small  amounts of propel- 
lant that were frozen by cold helium ingested into the feedlines. Although it was not a 
normal depletion shutdown, no hazardous o r  detrimental effects were apparent. 
The performance of the ascent engine was not verified to  have been within the 
expected accuracy because of the loss  of A P  (change in  pressure from tank outlet to 
engine interface) flow-rate measurements and because of the high roll ra tes  of the 
vehicle during propellant depletion; however, the engine-pressure measurements and 
the vehicle velocities that were obtained indicated that the ascent-engine performance 
was within the nominal predicted tolerances. 
Apollo 9 Mission 
The Apollo 9 mission (LM-3) included the first manned flight test of the LM. The 
mission was the second manned flight tes t  of the Saturn V launch vehicle and the third 
manned flight of the Block II command and service module (CSM). 
The overall mission objective was to evaluate crew operation of the separated LM 
and to demonstrate docked-vehicle functions in an earth-orbital mission, thereby qual- 
ifying the combined spacecraft for  lunar flight. The LM operations included an ascent- 
engine firing to propellant depletion after final separation from the CSM. 
The APS w a s  used for two firings: a 3-second firing while the ascent stage was 
manned and an unmanned firing to propellant depletion. The LM was out of ground- 
tracking-station range during the first ascent-engine firing; therefore, no data were 
available. However, when data were first acquired after the firing, system pressures  
and temperatures were normal. The second ascent-engine fir ing was initiated suc- 
cessfully and lasted for 362. 3 seconds. During the second firing, system pressures  
were lower than expected for the first 290 seconds, thus indicating a malfunction in  the 
primary regulator. The lower operating pressures  produced no undesirable effects in 
the system. The second ascent-engine firing was terminated by the planned oxidizer 
depletion. The engine was  commanded off approximately 10 seconds later.  The deple- 
tion shutdown appeared nominal in all respects.  The transient characterist ics that the 
engine demonstrated during the oxidizer-depletion shutdown mode were investigated 
and were found to compare favorably with ground-based test data. All applicable 
transient- specification requirements were met. 
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A detailed assessment was made of the lower-than-expected system pressures  to 
determine the cause and magnitude of the malfunction. After extensive testing in the 
thermochemical test area at the MSC and on test rig PA-1 at-the WSTF, it was con- 
cluded that the most probable cause of the anomaly was contamination of the regulator 
during the solenoid-valve replacement. A review of regulator backflow and system- 
repair procedures during checkout on LM vehicles indicated the possibility of minor 
backflow on vehicles through LM-7. Cautions were added to the changeout procedures, 
and special instructions were given to personnel. Increased surveillance of regulator 
checkout data was  maintained by the subsystem office for all subsequent vehicles. 
Apollo 10 Mission 
The Apollo 10  mission was the first flight test of the LM in a lunar environment 
and the second manned LM flight. Because the mission objective was  to show a fire- 
to-depletion firing and not a AV, the amount of propellant loaded was  approximately 
50 percent that of the nominal lunar mission. 
The overall mission objective was  to duplicate, as closely as possible, a lunar- 
landing mission, with the exception of lunar landing and lift-off. Inherent in this objec- 
tive was  the performance of the APS during the lunar-orbit-insertion maneuver. Also 
included as mission objectives were verifications of LM operation in a lunar environ- 
ment and of mission support of all spacecraft at lunar distances. 
Docking of the CSM with the LM and separation of the docked vehicles from the 
Saturn IVB occurred 4 hours after launch. Undocking of the LM from the CSM in lunar 
orbit occurred 98.5 hours after launch. Approximately 2 hours after completion of 
the descent propulsion system firing, the descent stage was separated and the APS 
engine was fired for 15.6 seconds. Upon completion of this insertion maneuver, the 
ascent stage was docked with the CSM, and the crew and equipment transfer was accom- 
plished. Approximately 6 hours later, the ascent stage was  separated, and the engine 
was ignited for  the 248.9-second burn to propellant depletion. 
Shortly after the ignition signal for  the first APS burn, the ascent-engine-quantity 
caution light came on, triggering a master caution and warning alarm. The ascent- 
engine-quantity caution light was controlled by the oxidizer and fuel low-level sensors 
in the propellant tanks. Approximately 1 second after the ascent engine "on" signal 
for the manned LM-4 APS burn, the oxidizer low-level sensor was activated for  approx- 
imately 1 second while the master a larm was on for 2 seconds before being manually 
reset. Low-level sensors in both oxidizer and fuel tanks operated as expected during 
the remainder of the first burn and the entire second burn. Based on this  performance, 
it was concluded that the signal received during the first burn was valid. 
The cause of the anomaly was believed to be insufficient settling of APS propel- 
lants before the burn. The LM-4 propellant tanks were filled to 50 percent, the least  
on any flown vehicle. Based on information contained in the Spacecraft Operation Data 
Book, an RCS ullage-propellant-settling maneuver of 3 to 4 seconds in duration would 
be adequate for  a.vehicle with the propellant load of LM-4. The actual RCS ullage- 
propellant-settling maneuver before APS first-burn ignition lasted for  a period of 
4.1 seconds. The propellant-settling maneuver was reexamined, and the settling ma- 
neuver duration was increased for  increased ullage (decreased propellant) volume. 
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Apollo 11 Miss ion 
The Apollo 11 mission (LM-6) was the third manned flight of the LM, the fifth 
manned flight of the Block 11 CSM, and the fourth manned flight of a Saturn V launch 
vehicle. The primary objective of the mission was to perform the first manned lunar 
landing and return. 
Burn time for  the APS lunar lift-off maneuver was 434.9 seconds. Upon comple- 
tion of the insertion maneuver, the ascent stage docked with the CSM, and the crew 
transfer and equipment transfer were effected. Approximately 3. 5 hours later, the 
ascent stage w a s  jettisoned. All APS performance parameters  were well within their  
respective limits. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In review of the ascent propulsion system development, several areas that could 
enhance the development of future subsystems a r e  discussed in  the following 
paragraphs. 
Definit ion of Realistic Requirements 
Requirements for the system and its components should be thoroughly defined 
before the beginning of the design phase. Typical examples of inadequate definitions 
at the beginning of the design phase were the stability requirement for  the engine, the 
propellant-vapor compatibility requirement for  the pressurization components, and the 
leakage requirements. Late definition of the stability and compatibility requirements 
caused redesign, which w a s  reflected by cost increase and schedule slippage. Overly 
stringent leakage requirements caused failures and redesign efforts that were not 
necessary . 
Flexible Program Flow Plan 
Early in the testing program, the pr ime contractor and vendors were working to 
a cost-incentive flow plan. As a result, vendors directed their  efforts to delivery of 
components rather than to problem solving and hardware development. This policy 
resulted in failures late in the development phase and in component replacement on 
the ascent propulsion system. This problem was most apparent in  the engine and regu- 
lator component area. A more flexible flow plan would have allowed component instal- 
lation at later opportunities. 
Leakage and Contamination Control 
Lunar module 1 had many leakage problems caused by overly stringent leakage 
requirements, the design of the system, and nonstandard measurement techniques. 
The stringent leakage requirement was initiated by the uncertainties and by the 
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corrosive nature of the oxidizer vapor. When stringent leakage control was  required, 
design changes (such as installing redundant seals with the capability to measure the 
integrity of the primary seal) were necessary. In addition, leakage-measurement tech- 
niques were different at the vendor facility, at the prime-contractor facility, and at 
the NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center. Attempts were made to standardize leakage- 
measurement techniques to ensure the ability to measure changes in leakage. Where 
stringent leakage control may be required, it is recommended that leakage- 
measurement techniques be standardized. 
Also, contamination was a problem (especially with check valves). This problem 
was magnified by the many component replacements. Where contamination control is 
critical, it is recommended that all functional components (such as regulators and 
check valves) have built-in filters. 
I nspection and Manufacturing Repeatability 
The sqi ib valve, the helium solenoid valve, the relief valve, and the engin ! 
underwent problems of manufacturing repeatability. The main cause of the problem was  
internal braze joints o r  welds that could not be inspected. In the engine, the injector, 
when fabricated, had cracks in the electron-beam welds. These cracks were caused 
by improper control of the welding parameters. Hardware should be designed to per- 
mit inspection of weld- and braze-joints. When this practice is not feasible, the weld 
parameters should be certified and supported by means of test samples from all quali- 
fied welders. 
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